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Distributed optimization decomposition for joint economic dispatch and
frequency regulation
Desmond Cai∗, Enrique Mallada† and Adam Wierman†
Abstract— Economic dispatch and frequency regulation are
typically viewed as fundamentally different problems in power
systems, and hence are typically studied separately. In this
paper, we frame and study a joint problem that optimizes both
slow timescale economic dispatch resources and fast timescale
frequency regulation resources. We provide sufficient conditions
under which the joint problem can be decomposed without
loss of optimality into slow and fast timescale problems. These
slow and fast timescale problems have appealing interpretations
as the economic dispatch and frequency regulation problems
respectively. Moreover, the fast timescale problem can be solved
using a distributed algorithm that preserves the stability of
the network during transients. We also apply this optimal
decomposition to propose an efficient market mechanism for
economic dispatch that coordinates with frequency regulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main objectives of every power system op-
erator is to schedule power generation to meet demand at
every time instant [1]–[3]. This is a challenging task that
seeks to schedule generators in a cost-efficient manner while
also respecting their limitations (e.g., ramp constraints and
capacity constraints) and responding rapidly to any supply-
demand imbalances that may emerge (e.g., generator outages
and line outages). To make matters more complex, slow
timescale control is typically performed using market mech-
anisms while fast timescale control is done via engineered
controllers.
The complexity of this global system operation problem
means that it is typically broken up into to separate sub-
problems – (slow timescale) economic dispatch and (fast
timescale) frequency regulation – which are studied inde-
pendently of each other.
Economic dispatch operates at a slow timescale (intervals
of 5 minutes or longer) and focuses on efficiency with respect
to costs. In particular, the economic dispatch problem seeks
to optimally schedule generators so that the total generation
cost is minimized subject to line limits and generation
capacity and ramping constraints. Economic dispatch has a
long history [1], [4]–[8]. It is currently implemented using a
market mechanism known as supply function bidding. In this
mechanism, generators submit supply functions to the system
operator which specify (as a function of price) the amount
a generator is willing to produce. The system operator
uses those bids to construct the implied cost functions and
solves a centralized optimization problem (over single or
multiple time periods) to schedule generators in a way that
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minimizes system costs while meeting demand and slow
timescale operating constraints (including line limits, gen-
eration capacity constraints, generation ramping constraints,
minimum generation constraints, security constraints, etc.).
A centralized market implementation is important both to
collect bid costs from generators and also because physical
laws of power flows impose coupled constraints between
generators.
Frequency regulation operates at a fast timescale (from 30
seconds to a few minutes) and focuses on stability rather than
efficiency. In particular, the operator seeks to compensate the
remaining imbalance between generation and demand, which
drives a deviation from the nominal frequency, by quickly
rescheduling fast ramping generators. Frequency regulation
has a long history [2], [9], [10]. It is currently implemented
by a mechanism known as Automatic Generation Control
(AGC), which aims to rebalance power and restore the
nominal frequency within independent control areas using
local measurements. Within each area, AGC uses information
on frequency deviation and inter-area flows to compute the
necessary change in power needed to rebalance supply and
demand in the system, and allocates this change among
different generators based on the market clearing allocations
from the last economic dispatch execution [1].
A. Contributions of this paper
While economic dispatch and frequency regulation each,
individually, have large and active literatures; these literatures
are almost completely disparate. To this point, there has been
no rigorous analysis of whether the combination of economic
dispatch and frequency regulation solves the global system
operator’s goal of managing generation resources in order to
minimize cost while maintaining stability.
The goal of this paper is to initiate such a study. In
particular, we seek to understand when the combination
of economic dispatch and frequency regulation optimally
solves the global system operator’s problem. More generally,
we seek to understand when the global system operator’s
problem can be decomposed, without loss of optimality,
into subproblems corresponding to economic dispatch and
frequency regulation.
Our main result provides an initial answer. In the context
of a DC power flow model and two classes of generators
(peakers and baseloads), we show that the global system
operator’s problem can be decomposed into two subproblems
corresponding to economic dispatch and frequency regulation
without loss of optimality as long as the generation schedule
induces no congestion on average and the time-average
prices within each slow timescale interval (used by economic
dispatch) are zero (Theorem 1).
This theorem can be viewed as providing a first-principles
justification for the current separation of the economic
dispatch and frequency regulation problems. Furthermore,
it provides a guide for the design of market mechanisms
for economic dispatch and control policies for frequency
regulation since it highlights a sufficient condition for such
algorithms to jointly solve the global problem.
In the case of frequency regulation, the form of the
problem that emerges from the optimization decomposition
differs in important ways from existing frequency regulation
operations (Section IV). First, the frequency regulation con-
troller proposed in this paper (which builds on [11]), uses
information on generators’ costs to drive the power system
to an operating point that minimizes its costs. On the other
hand, existing approaches use participation factors from the
latest economic dispatch run to drive the power system to a
stable operating point. Since participation factors might not
reflect actual generation costs, the resulting allocation might
not be optimal (from the perspective of cost minimization).
In the case of economic dispatch, we illustrate that the
form of the problem that emerges from the optimization
decomposition can be solved using a market implementation
based on supply function bidding (Section V), similar to ex-
isting operations. However, our proposed mechanism differs
from existing operations in that we allocate frequency reg-
ulation resources optimally and we do so without requiring
additional communication in the market. Existing operations
use economic dispatch LMPs to directly compensate fast
timescale frequency regulation resources, where the latter
are allocated using engineered controllers without regards to
generation costs. The decomposition in this paper suggests
that, instead, supply functions submitted at the economic
dispatch timescale should be used to allocate frequency
regulation resources via the distributed algorithm in Sec-
tion IV. Our main result in Section V shows that, if the
conditions required for optimal decomposition hold, then the
competitive equilibrium of our proposed mechanism leads to
efficient (optimal) operation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Our aim in this paper is to understand when the system
operator’s global objective can be decomposed into subprob-
lems that correspond to economic dispatch and frequency
regulation. To this end, we formulate a model of the global
objective that includes the joint objectives of economic
dispatch and frequency regulation. In particular, our model
considers the balancing of supply and demand at both
the economic dispatch and frequency regulation timescales.
We focus on a DC power flow model and consider two
generation types (peakers and baseloads) which differ in the
responsiveness they can provide.
A. Network model
Throughout, we consider a finite time horizon partitioned
into K discrete intervals indexed by k ∈ K where K =
{0, 1, . . . ,K−1}. In principle, the length of each time period
k may range from as little as seconds to as long as minutes.
However, in this paper, we focus on the case where the length
of each time period is on the order tens of seconds.
We consider a connected network with N nodes and L
links. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , N} and L = {1, 2, . . . , L} denote
the set of nodes and links respectively. We index nodes by
n ∈ N and links by l ∈ L. Without loss of generality, we
assign each link l ∈ L an arbitrary orientation and we let
i(l) ∈ N and j(l) ∈ N denote the tail and head of the link
respectively.
We assume that each node n has a deterministic inelastic
demand dk,n > 0 in period k. We assume that demand
dk,n at each node is never constant over adjacent time
periods. We also assume that each node n has two generators
which we refer to as peaker and baseload; and we denote
denote their production quantities in period k by qpk,n and
qbk,n respectively. Let the vectors dk := (dk,1, . . . , dk,N ),
qpk := (q
p
k,1, . . . , q
p
k,N ), and q
b
k := (q
b
k,1, . . . , q
p
k,N ). Then
the vector of injections at all nodes in period k is given by
qpk + q
b
k − dk.
The supply-demand balance constraints are given by:
1>(qbk + q
p
k − dk) = 0, k ∈ K, (1)
where 1 ∈ RN denotes the vector of all ones.
We adopt the DC power flow model for line flows. Let
θk,n to denote the phase angle of node n in period k. For
a link l ∈ L, let pk,l denote the power flow on the line in
period k, and let Bl denote the sensitivity of the flow with
respect to changes in the phase difference θk,i(l) − θk,j(l) in
period k. Let the vectors θk := (θk,1, . . . , θk,N ) and pk :=
(pk,1, . . . , pk,L) and the matrix B := diag(B1, . . . , BL).
Hence, the line flows in period k are given by:
pk = BC
>θk,
where C ∈ RN×L is the incidence matrix of the directed
graph. Note that the injections are given by:
qbk + q
p
k − dk = Cpk = Lθk, (2)
where L := CBC>.
Note that (1) and (2) are equivalent. This is because, for
any set of power injections that satisfy (1), we can always
find a θk that satisfy (2). Conversely, since 1>C = 0, any
injections that satisfy (2) also satisfy (1).
Hence, the line flows can be written in terms of the power
injections:
pk = BC
>L†(qbk + q
p
k − dk),
where L† denotes the pseudo-inverse of L. Let H :=
BC>L†. Let fl denote the capacity of line l and let the
vector f := (f1, . . . , fL). Then the line flow constraints are
given by:
− f ≤ H(qbk + qpk − dk) ≤ f, k ∈ K. (3)
B. Generation types
As mentioned above, we consider two types of generation
– peakers and baseloads – where peaker refers to more
responsive generation and baseload refers to less responsive
generation. Recall that qpn,k and q
b
n,k denote the production
quantities of the peaker and baseload respectively at node n
in period k.
We assume that the peaker and baseload at node n incur
costs of cpn(q
p
k,n) and c
b
n(q
b
k,n) respectively for their produc-
tions in period k where cpn : R+ → R+ and cbn : R+ → R+
are continuously differentiable and convex. We also assume
that the peaker and baseload have capacities q¯pn ∈ R+
and q¯bn ∈ R+ respectively and that cpn(qpk,n) → +∞ and
cbn(q
b
k,n) → +∞ as qpk,n → {0, q¯pn} and qbk,n → {0, q¯bn}
respectively. Let the vectors q¯p := (q¯p1 , . . . , q¯
p
N ) and q¯
b :=
(q¯b1, . . . , q¯
b
N ). These capacity constraints are given by:
0 ≤ qpk ≤ q¯p, k ∈ K; (4)
0 ≤ qbk ≤ q¯b, k ∈ K. (5)
We model the fact that baseloads are less responsive than
peakers using two features.
First, we assume that peakers may change production
levels every time period while baseloads change production
levels every S time periods where K mod S = 0. Let S
denote the set of time periods in which baseloads may change
production levels, i.e. S = {0, S, 2S, . . . ,K − S}. For each
k ∈ S, let Kk = {k, k+ 1, . . . , k+ S − 1} denote the set of
time periods in the corresponding length-S interval during
which baseload productions are constant. For each k ∈ S
and k′ ∈ Kk, define s(k′) := Sb(k − 1)/Sc = k. Then the
constraints on baseloads’ decisions are represented by:
qbk = q
b
s(k), k ∈ K. (6)
C. System operator’s objective
The global system operator’s objective is to dispatch the
baseload and peaker generation in order to minimize the total
cost needed to satisfy demand and operating constraints. This
is formalized as follows.
SY STEM : minimize
∑
k
∑
n
(
cbn(q
b
n,k) + c
p
n(q
p
n,k)
)
over qbk, q
p
k, k ∈ K;
s.t. (1), (3), (4)− (6).
We assume throughout that this optimization is feasible.
In addition to the constraints highlighted above there are
many practical issues that must be taken into account in any
feasible solution. At the fast time scale, system demand must
be measured precisely and controls implemented such that
generators do not lose synchrony. Hence, a practical imple-
mentation must include mechanisms to restore frequency and
preserve grid stability. A practical implementation must also
include market mechanisms to extract cost functions from
generators.
The current practice in economic dispatch is to clear the
market without fast time scale supply-demand constraints.
Instead, these fast time scale constraints are implemented
using frequency regulation controls without consideration
of the costs of generation. In Section III, we provide an
architectural decomposition of the global objective into slow
time scale and fast time scale subproblems without loss of
optimality under certain conditions. We propose a distributed
frequency regulation algorithm to implement the solution to
the fast time scale subproblem and a market mechanism to
extract cost functions for the slow time scale subproblem.
We address these in Sections IV and V respectively.
D. Lagrangian relaxation
Crucial to our main result is the relaxation of the supply-
demand balance constraints and line flow constraints of
the system operator’s objective. In particular, let λk denote
the Lagrange multipliers associated with the supply-demand
balance constraint (1) in period k and let µ−k,l, µ
+
k,l denote
the Lagrange multipliers associated with the negative and
positive line flow constraints (3) respectively in period k.
Let µ−k := (µk,1, . . . , µk,L) and µ
+
k := (µk,1, . . . , µk,L).
Let x := (qbk, q
p
k)k∈K and y := (λk, µ
−
k , µ
+
k )k∈K Then, the
Lagrangian associated with relaxing those constraints is:
L(x, y) =
∑
k∈K\S
f(qpk, (λk, µ
−
k , µ
+
k ))
+
∑
k∈S
g((qbk, q
p
k), (λk′ , µ
−
k′ , µ
+
k′)k′∈Kk),
where:
f(qpk, (λk, µ
−
k , µ
+
k ))
:=
∑
n
cpn(q
p
n,k)− λk1>qpk −
(
µ−k − µ+k
)>
Hqpk,
g((qbk, q
p
k), (λk′ , µ
−
k′ , µ
+
k′)k′∈Kk)
:=
∑
n
(
Scbn(q
b
n,k) + c
p
n(q
p
n,k)
)
− λk1>qpk
−
∑
k′∈Kk
λk′1
>qbk −
∑
k′∈Kk
(
µ−k′ − µ+k′
)>
Hqbk.
Since SY STEM is convex and the constraints are linear, it
is equivalent to the following problem:
max
y:µ−k ≥0, µ+k≥0, k∈K
min
x:(4)−(6)
L(x, y).
We refer to the optimal y in this problem as the optimal
Lagrange multipliers.
III. ARCHITECTURAL DECOMPOSITION
Our goal in this paper is to understand, from first princi-
ples, how the structure of the global system operator’s prob-
lem can guide the architecture of control for power systems.
To that end, our main result is a decomposition of the global
system operator’s problem that exposes fast timescale and
slow timescale control problems and that serves as guides
for the design of market mechanisms for economic dispatch
and control policies frequency regulation. Importantly, the
decomposition we derive identifies a rigorous connection
between economic dispatch and frequency regulation that
ensures, under certain conditions, that the combination solves
the global system operator’s problem.
Theorem 1. Let (qb∗k , q
p∗
k )k∈K denote the optimal
baseload and peaker productions of SY STEM and
let (λ∗k, µ
−∗
k , µ
+∗
k )k∈K denote the optimal Lagrange
multipliers. Suppose that, for each k ∈ S, we have:
(a) qb∗k = 0, or;
(b)
∑
k′∈Kk\{k}H
>(µ−∗k′ − µ+∗k′ ) = 0 and qp∗k = 0, or;
(c)
∑
k′∈Kk\{k}H
>(µ−∗k′ − µ+∗k′ ) = 0 and∑
k′∈Kk\{k} λ
∗
k′ = 0.
Then (qb∗k , q
p∗
k )k∈S is the optimal solution to the following
problem:
ED : min
∑
k∈S
∑
n
(
Scbn(q
b
k,n) + c
p
n(q
p
k,n)
)
over qbk, q
p
k, k ∈ S;
s.t. 1>(qbk + q
p
k − dk) = 0, k ∈ S;
−f ≤ H (qbk + qpk − dk) ≤ f, k ∈ S;
0 ≤ qbk ≤ q¯b, k ∈ S;
0 ≤ qpk ≤ q¯p, k ∈ S.
And, for each k ∈ K \ S, qp∗k is the optimal solution to the
following problem:
FRk : min
∑
n c
p
n(q
p
k,n)
over qpk;
s.t. 1>(qb∗s(k) + q
p
k − dk) = 0; (7a)
− f ≤ H
(
qb∗s(k)+q
p
k−dk
)
≤ f ; (7b)
0 ≤ qpk ≤ q¯p; (7c)
given qb∗s(k).
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the Appendix. At a
high level, the result follows from a dual decomposition of
the system operator’s problem into separate problems that
can be interpreted as problems on two different time scales.
Note that the subproblems ED and FRk can be solved in a
modular fashion with causal communication. In particular,
ED will be solved first once and then only the optimal
baseload generations are needed as setpoints to solve FRk.
We denote the two sub-optimizations in Theorem 1 by ED
and FRk because they can be interpreted as the economic
dispatch and frequency regulation components, respectively,
of existing operations. The correspondence is immediate in
the case of ED and we discuss how the decomposition
leads to improved market mechanisms for economic dispatch
based on supply function bidding in Section V. However, the
correspondence may not be as clear in the case of FRk.
We show in Section IV that FRk can in fact be solved
via distributed frequency regulation algorithms, although
these algorithms deviate from current practice since current
approaches typically do not optimize for generation costs.
Perhaps the most important part of Theorem 1 to discuss is
the conditions required for the proposed decomposition to be
optimal. The interpretation of these conditions is as follows.
Condition (a), that qb∗k = 0, corresponds to settings where
baseloads are always more expensive than peakers; thus
implying that it is never optimal to use baseload generation
(since they are also less responsive). Similarly, the condition
that qp∗k = 0 corresponds to settings where peakers are
more expensive than baseloads, thus implying that it is never
optimal to use peaker generation when there is an option to
use baseload generation. The conditions on µ−∗k and µ
+∗
k can
be interpreted as guaranteeing that the generation schedule
in period k ∈ S induces no congestion (on average) on the
aggregate network over each slow timescale interval. Finally,
the condition on λ∗k can be interpreted as guaranteeing that
the average energy prices over each slow timescale interval
are zero, thus implying that generation at the slow timescale
can be optimally scheduled by solving a myopic problem.
Given the above, the most interesting cases seem to be
(b) and (c), which highlight that time-averaged prices are the
primary determinant of whether the global system operator’s
problem can be decomposed into separate timescales without
loss of optimality. We might expect the average energy prices
over each slow timescale interval to be zero or very small
if the slow timescale demand dk for k ∈ S is a zero-mean
forecast of actual demands over the slow timescale interval.
In practice, congestion typically occurs over a very small
minority of lines, and hence we can expect the average
aggregation congestion prices for most nodal injections to
be zero or very small relative to the costs of energy.
Note that Theorem 1 is close in spirit to work in com-
munication networks that uses optimization decomposition
to justify and optimize protocol layering, e.g., see [12]–
[15]. This work provides a rigorous way to think about
the architectural design of communication networks. Though
similar in spirit, Theorem 1 highlights a crucial difference
between communication networks and power networks. In
particular, in communication networks, different layers in the
protocol stack may coordinate by communicating primal and
dual variables when solving the sub-optimizations. However,
such mechanics do not apply to power networks since
the nature of the timescales implies that sub-optimizations
cannot have non-causal dependencies.
Finally, note that Theorem 1 focuses only on the question
of when the system operator’s problem can be decomposed
without loss of optimality. An important extension of this
work is to understand the efficiency loss in cases where this
decomposition is no longer optimal.
IV. DISTRIBUTED FREQUENCY REGULATION
The goal of this section is to illustrate that the solution
of FRk can be implemented using distributed frequency
regulation controllers that respect the engineering constraints
of the system. Besides achieving optimality, a practical
solution should introduce changes on the power scheduling
that preserve the network stability; it should be robust to
unexpected system events; and it should be able to quickly
aggregate distributed network information in order to guar-
antee constraints (7a) and (7b).
In this section we provide a distributed algorithm that not
only solves FRk, but also cleverly uses network dynamics in
order to aggregate the necessary information. The algorithm
can be interpreted as performing distributed frequency reg-
ulation by sending different regulation signals to each bus.
Importantly, the algorithm only requires local information
and can be shown to preserve the stability of the network.
A. A dynamic model
Before introducing our algorithm for distributed frequency
regulation, we first need to add dynamics to our system
model. In particular, we describe a model for system changes
within a single time period k in the following.
Let t denote the time evolution within the time period
and assume without loss of generality that t ∈ (k, k + 1].
Let qpk(t) := (q
p
k,1(t), . . . , q
p
k,N (t)) denote the quantities
generated by the peakers at time t. We assume that baseloads
and demand do not change within the time period. Hence,
baseloads generate qbk and demand consumes dk. Then, the
system changes within the time period are governed by the
swing equations which we assume to have the following
form:
Mω˙k(t) = q
b
k + q
p
k(t)− dk −Dωk(t)− Lθk(t); (8a)
θ˙k(t) = ωk(t), (8b)
where ωk(t) := (ωk,1(t), . . . , ωk,N (t)) are the frequency
deviations from the nominal value at time t, θk(t) :=
(θk,1(t), . . . , θk,N (t)) are the phase angles at time t, M :=
diag(M1, . . . ,MN ) where Mn is the aggregate inertia of
baseload and peaker n, and D := diag(D1, . . . , DN ) where
Dn is the aggregate damping of baseload and peaker n. Here,
the notation x˙ denotes the time derivative, i.e. x˙ = dx/dt.
Equation (8) is a linearized version of the nonlinear
network dynamics widely adopted by the power systems
community, e.g., [2], [16]. We refer the reader to [17] for
a detailed explanation of its derivation.
B. Current practice
In today’s grid, frequency regulation is implemented using
a control scheme known as Automatic Generation Control
(AGC) that is executed between two different executions of
ED. To implement AGC, the power grid is divided into
several control areas, each one of them in charge of restoring
the frequency to its nominal value and compensating its own
supply demand imbalance.
This is achieved for a given area A by generating a unique
control signal known as Area Control Error (ACEA) given
by
ACEA(t) = KAωA(t) + ∆TieA(t),
where ωA(t) represents the average frequency in area A,
KA is the frequency bias setting and ∆TieA(t) represents
the net area interchange deviation with respect to the inter-
change scheduled by ED. The signal ACEA(t) is then sent
through a proportional-integral controller that outputs the
total amount of power generation that needs to be corrected.
Finally, the total change in power needed is distributed
among generators using participating factors that are pro-
portional to the nodal prices λs(k),n + e>nH
>(µ−s(k)−µ+s(k))
in ED where en denotes a unit vector with a 1 in the nth
component.
There are a number of sources of inefficiency in this
approach. First, AGC relies on information from the eco-
nomic dispatch problem that is likely out of date due to
the timescale difference. Second, AGC does not satisfy
the thermal limits at fast timescales. Third, AGC requires
the definition of self-balancing areas which are forced to
independently rebalance supply and demand within each
area [1].
These problems have recently been acknowledged by the
research community [18], [19]. The main solution strategy
proposed is the use distributed algorithms that dynamically
adapt to power fluctuations in order to rebalance the system
while minimizing the total generation cost. While these
solutions can successfully adapt to rapid changes on the
network, they do not respect the ramping constraints of
baseline generator and cannot be implemented together with
economic dispatch.
C. Distributed frequency regulation
In contrast to AGC, we now introduce a distributed,
continuous-time algorithm that provably solves FRk, and
thus (by Theorem 1) integrates with economic dispatch to
optimally solve the system operator’s problem while satisfy-
ing the thermal line limits.
Our solution is based on a novel reverse and forward
engineering approach for distributed control design in power
systems [11], [18], [20], [21]. The key step in this approach
is to formulate an optimization problem whose primal-dual
algorithm includes the power network dynamics as part of
it and where the remaining part can be implemented using
distributed communication and computation [11].
The algorithm operates as follows. Each peaker n updates
its power generation using
qpk,n(t) = [c
p
n
′−1(ωk,n(t) + λk,n(t))]
q¯pn
0 , (9)
where cpn
′
(x) = ∂∂xc
p
n(x) and c
p
n
′−1 denotes its inverse. The
projection [ui]
q¯pn
0 ensures that ui is always within [0, q¯
p
n], and
λk,n(t) is a control signal generated using:
DFR : λ˙k(t) = ζ
λ(t)
(
qb∗k − dk + qpk(t)− Lφk(t)
)
; (10a)
µ˙+k (t) = ζ
µ+
[
BC>φk(t)− f
]+
µ+k
; (10b)
µ˙−k (t) = ζ
µ− [−f −BC>φk(t)]+µ−k ; (10c)
φ˙k(t) = χ
φ
(
Lλk(t)− CB(µ+k (t)− µ−k (t))
)
, (10d)
where ζλ := diag(ζλ1 , . . . , ζ
λ
N ), ζ
µ+ := diag(ζµ
+
1 , . . . , ζ
µ+
L ),
ζµ
−
:= diag(ζµ
−
1 , . . . , ζ
µ−
L ) and χ
φ := diag(χφ1 , . . . , χ
φ
N )
denote the respective control gains. Given vectors x, y ∈
RM and M = {1, . . . ,M}, the element-wise projection
[y]+x ensures that the dynamics x˙ = [y]
+
x have a solution
x(t) that remains in the positive orthant. That is, [y]+x :=
([ym]
+
xm)m∈M, with [ym]
+
xm = 0 if xm = 0 and ym < 0;
[ym]
+
xm = ym, otherwise.
The proposed solution (9) − (10) can be interpreted as a
frequency regulation algorithm in which each peaker receives
a different regulation signal (9) depending on its location in
the network.
D. Optimality and convergence
We now show how the distributed algorithm described
above converges to the optimal solution of FRk.
To this end, we first modify FRk and define a related
problem FR′k that can be shown to be equivalent to FRk
while, at the same time, making the role of frequency
in maintaining supply-demand balance explicit. This is a
nontrivial modification of FRk and is crucial to guaranteeing
the stability of our distributed algorithm.
FR′k : min
∑
n
(
cpn(q
p
k,n) +Dn
ω2n
2
)
over qpk, ωk, θk, φk;
s.t. qb∗s(k) + q
p
k − dk −Dωk = Lθk; (11a)
qb∗s(k) + q
p
k − dk = Lφk; (11b)
− f ≤ BC>φk ≤ f ; (11c)
0 ≤ qp ≤ q¯p; (11d)
given qb∗s(k).
Constraint (11a) makes explicit the fact that, whenever sup-
ply and demand do not match, the mismatch is compensated
by a change in the frequency. We have also used the
equivalent per node supply-demand balance constraint (2) in-
stead of the aggregate supply-demand balance constraint (1).
Constraint (11b) ensures that the optimal solution satisfies
ω∗k = 0 so that supply and demand are balanced. Constraint
(11c) imposes line flow limits. However, instead of using
actual line flows BC>θk, we impose these limits on virtual
flows BC>φk.
The next proposition formally relates FRk and FR′k and
guarantees the optimality of (9)− (10).
Proposition 1 (Optimality). Let qp∗∗k and (q
p∗
k , ω
∗
k, θ
∗
k, φ
∗
k)
be optimal solutions of FRk and FR′k respectively. Then,
the following statements are true:
(i) Frequency restoration: ω∗k = 0;
(ii) Generation equivalence: qp∗∗k = q
p∗
k ;
(iii) Line flow equivalence:
BC>θ∗k = H
(
qb∗s(k) + q
p∗∗
k − dk
)
.
Moreover, a vector (qp∗k , ω
∗
k, θ
∗
k, φ
∗
k, λ
∗, µ+∗, µ−∗) is an equi-
librium point of (8)− (10) if and only if it is a primal-dual
optimal solution of FR′k.
What remains is to guarantee the convergence of the
distributed frequency regulation algorithm.
Proposition 2 (Convergence). Given the distributed fre-
quency regulation scheme (9) − (10) and the network dy-
namics (8). Then, provided that cpn(·) is twice continuous
differentiable with (cpn)
′′(·) ≥ α > 0 (α-strictly convex), the
coupled dynamics (9)− (10) and (8) converge globally to an
optimal solution of FRk.
The proof of Proposition 2 follows from [11, Theorem 9].
It is easy to show that by substituting the phase representation
of the line flows BCT θk with pk in FR′k and (8), the whole
system (9)− (10) and (8) is a primal-dual algorithm of FR′k.
Therefore, Theorem 9 in [11] guarantees global asymptotic
convergence to an equilibrium point which by Proposition 1
is an optimal solution of both FR′k and FRk. We remark
the controllers of [11] have additional states, but the proof
in this simpler case is identical.
V. A MARKET MECHANISM FOR ECONOMIC DISPATCH
We now move our attention to the economic dispatch
component of the decomposition provided by Theorem 1.
The goal of this section is to illustrate that the solution of
the economic dispatch problem formalized in ED can be
implemented using a market mechanism based on supply
function bidding. The mechanism we propose aligns with
current practice, but differs in an important way that ensures
proper coordination with frequency regulation, thus avoiding
the inefficiency of approaches adopted today.
A. Current practice
The economic dispatch problem is solved in practice
using complicated market mechanisms, see [5], [22]–[24] for
an overview. Briefly, existing markets price slow timescale
economic dispatch resources using locational marginal prices
(LMPs) which are derived from Lagrange multipliers on the
energy balance and congestion constraints. As we described
in Section IV-B, the LMPs are used to compensate any
frequency regulation resources dispatched within each slow
timescale interval.
This implementation is adopted, in part, because of the
short timescale of frequency regulation (on the order of
seconds), which makes it challenging to implement separate
markets for each frequency regulation interval. However,
inefficiencies arise because the Lagrange multipliers may
vary within each slow timescale interval so prices computed
from the economic dispatch problem may not provide the
appropriate incentives for frequency regulation. Such ineffi-
ciencies are becoming more significant due to the growth of
renewables [25]–[27].
B. Market Mechanism
The approach for economic dispatch suggested by the
decomposition in Theorem 1 is similar to current practice,
but it also provides insight on how to avoid the inefficiency
highlighted above.
In particular, we propose a market mechanism that op-
erates on the timescale of economic dispatch but includes
an efficient pricing mechanism for fast timescale frequency
regulation. Our proposed mechanism is efficient if the con-
ditions for decomposability of the global problem provided
in Theorem 1 hold and does not require any more commu-
nication than existing market mechanisms.
Concretely, in our proposal the system operator collects
supply function bids from generators at the slow timescale
and solves the economic dispatch problem as in the cur-
rent practice. However, instead of compensating frequency
regulation resources using slow timescale locational prices,
the system operator uses the bids to allocate the peaking
resources efficiently at the fast timescale.
1) Assumptions: In this section, we make the following
assumptions. We assume that generators are not capacity-
constrained, i.e. q¯b = q¯p = ∞. We also assume that
there exists a continuously differentiable convex function
c : R+ → R+ such that peaker and baseload cost functions
are proportional to c, that is:
cpn(·) = (1/θpn)c(·);
cbn(·) = (1/θbn)c(·),
for some θpn, θ
b
n > 0. In practice, generators do have capacity
constraints. However, these assumptions are imposed primar-
ily to simplify the exposition. Moreover, many studies of
electricity markets are performed using quadratic costs [28]–
[30].
2) Supply functions: Each supply function specifies (as
a function of price) the amount the generator is willing
to produce. We assume that supply functions are chosen
from a parameterized family of supply functions. Formally,
we assume that a supply function within the parameterized
family is represented by a parameter θ ∈ R+. Each supply
function indicates that, at a price p, the generator is willing
to supply the quantity θs(p), where s : R+ → R+ is a
differentiable function. We define the surrogate cost function
associated with this supply function as:
cˆ(q, θ) := (1/θ)
∫ q
0
s−1(q¯)dq¯.
This definition is motivated by the practice in existing
electricity markets. Numerous studies have explored different
functional forms of s and their impact on the efficiency of the
market, e.g., [6], [24], [31]–[33]. For this paper, we assume
that s(p) = (1/θ)c′−1(θp). It follows that:
cˆ(q, θ) = (1/θ)
∫ q
0
c′(q¯)dq¯ = (1/θ)c(q).
3) Mechanism: Each baseload and peaker submits supply
functions to the system operator and the system operator uses
these supply functions to construct surrogate cost functions
and clears the market by solving ED and FRk using the
surrogate cost functions.
Formally, each baseload n submits a sequence of supply
functions (θˆbk,n)k∈S to the system operator where θˆ
b
k,n is its
supply function in period k ∈ S . Each peaker n submits
a sequence of supply functions (θˆpk,n)k∈S to the system
operator where θˆps(k),n is its supply function in period k ∈
K. Note that each peaker n only chooses a single supply
function θˆps(k),n for all periods k ∈ Kk. Hence, the bids
in the economic dispatch timescale are used as bids in the
frequency regulation timescale.
We assume that baseloads and peakers are price-takers.
Hence, given a sequence of prices (pk,n)k∈K, each baseload
n chooses bids (θˆbk,n)k∈S to maximize its profit:
Bn : maximize
∑
k∈S S
(
pk,nθˆ
b
k,ns(pk,n)
−(1/θbn)c(θˆbk,ns(pk,n))
)
over θˆbk,n, k ∈ S;
s.t. 0 ≤ θˆbk,ns(pk,n), k ∈ S;
given pk,n, k ∈ K,
and each peaker n chooses bids (θˆpk,n)k∈S to maximize its
profit:
Pn : maximize
∑
k∈K
(
pk,nθˆ
p
s(k),ns(pk,n)
−(1/θpn)c(θˆps(k),ns(pk,n))
)
over θˆpk,n, k ∈ S;
s.t. 0 ≤ θˆps(k),ns(pk,n), k ∈ K;
given pk,n, k ∈ K.
Let θˆbk := (θˆ
b
k,1, . . . , θˆ
b
k,N ) and θˆ
p
k := (θˆ
p
k,1, . . . , θˆ
p
k,N )
denote the vectors of bids in period k. Given the bids
(θˆbk, θˆ
p
k)k∈S , the system operator solves ED for the dispatch
that minimizes the surrogate costs. The nodal prices are
given by pk = λ∗k + H
>(µ−∗k − µ+∗k ) where λ∗k, µ−∗k , µ+∗k
are optimal Lagrange multipliers in ED. Then, in each fast
time scale period k ∈ K \ S, it implements the frequency
regulation algorithm DFR with the surrogate costs functions
to drive the system to the optimal solution of FRk. The nodal
prices are again given by pk = λ∗k + H
>(µ−∗k − µ+∗k ) but
now λ∗k, µ
−∗
k , µ
+∗
k are optimal Lagrange multipliers in FRk.
C. Efficiency
Given the mechanism described above, our focus is on
understanding the efficiency of equilibrium outcomes. The
following formalizes the notion of a competitive equilibrium
we consider.
Definition 1. We say that (θˆbk, θˆ
p
k)k∈S is a competitive
equilibrium if there exists (pk)k∈K such that:
(a) For all n, (θˆbk,n)k∈S is an optimal solution to Bn;
(b) For all n, (θˆpk,n)k∈S is an optimal solution to Pn;
(c) For all k, pk = λ∗k + H
>(µ−∗k − µ+∗k ), where:
(i) (λ∗k, µ
−∗
k , µ
+∗
k )k∈S are optimal Lagrange multipli-
ers in ED with surrogate cost functions cpn(q
p
k,n) =
cˆ(qpk,n, θˆ
p
k,n); and (ii) λ
∗
k, µ
−∗
k , µ
+∗
k are optimal La-
grange multipliers in FRk for all k ∈ K \ S with
surrogate cost functions cpn(q
p
k,n) = cˆ(q
p
k,n, θˆ
p
k,n).
Our main result for this section follows. It highlights that,
as a consequence of Theorem 1, the mechanism we propose
in this section guarantees that any efficient allocation is
supported by a competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Efficiency). Suppose that the conditions in
Theorem 1 hold. Then:
(a) Any competitive equilibrium is efficient.
(b) Any efficient allocation can be sustained by a competi-
tive equilibrium.
Proposition 3 resembles classical welfare theorems,
e.g., [32], [34]–[36]. However, it differs from typical com-
petitive equilibria frameworks because peakers are restricted
to bidding a single supply function over each economic
dispatch interval even though the latter contains multiple fast
timescale market instances.
This creates challenges in guaranteeing existence of equi-
libria and efficiency that do not arise in typical competitive
equilibria frameworks. Specifically, the space of bid func-
tions needs to be expressive enough for generators to convey
their costs (in multiple fast timescale market instances)
using a single bid function. This is not an issue in existing
market frameworks where separate bids are collected for
separate market instances. Hence our restriction that s(p) =
(1/θ)c′−1(θp).
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. First, by substituting the baseloads’
decision constraints (6) in SY STEM , we can eliminate the
variables qbk for all k /∈ S. Now, instead of relaxing all the
supply-demand balance constraints and line flow constraints,
relax only the constraints associated with period k ∈ K \ S .
The remaining constraints (that have not been relaxed) are:
1>(qbk + q
p
k − dk) = 0, k ∈ S; (12a)
−f ≤ H(qbk + qpk − dk) ≤ f, k ∈ S; (12b)
0 ≤ qpk ≤ q¯p, k ∈ K; (12c)
0 ≤ qbk ≤ q¯b, k ∈ S; (12d)
Let y¯ = (λk, µ−k , µ
+
k )k∈K\S . The Lagrangian associated with
relaxing only those afore-mentioned constraints is given by:
L¯(x, y¯) =
∑
k∈K\S
f¯(qpk, (λk, µ
−
k , µ
+
k ))
+
∑
k∈S
g¯((qbk, q
p
k), (λk′ , µ
−
k′ , µ
+
k′)k′∈Kk\{k}),
where:
f¯(qpk, (λk, µ
−
k , µ
+
k ))
:=
∑
n
cpn(q
p
n,k)− λk1>qpk −
(
µ−k − µ+k
)>
Hqpk,
g¯((qbk, q
p
k), (λk′ , µ
−
k′ , µ
+
k′)k′∈Kk\{k})
:=
∑
n
(
Scbn(q
b
n,k) + c
p
n(q
p
n,k)
)
−
∑
k′∈Kk\{k}
λk′1
>qbk −
∑
k′∈Kk\{k}
(
µ−k′ − µ+k′
)>
Hqbk.
Hence, SY STEM is equivalent to the following problem:
max
y¯:µ−k ≥0, µ+k≥0, k∈K\S
min
x:(12a)−(12d)
L¯(x, y¯).
It is clear that the minimization over x separates into
subproblems. For each k ∈ K \ S, we have the following
subproblem:
F¯Rk : minimize f¯(q
p
k, (λk, µ
−
k , µ
+
k ))
over qpk;
s.t. 0 ≤ qpk ≤ q¯p;
given λk, µ
−
k , µ
+
k .
And we have the following subproblem for the remaining
variables:
E¯D : minimize
∑
k∈S g¯((q
b
k, q
p
k), (λk′ , µ
−
k′ , µ
+
k′)k′∈Kk\{k})
over qpk, q
b
k, k ∈ S;
s.t. 1>(qbk + q
p
k − dk) = 0, k ∈ S;
−f ≤ H(qbk + qpk − dk) ≤ f, k ∈ S;
0 ≤ qpk ≤ q¯p, k ∈ S;
0 ≤ qbk ≤ q¯b, k ∈ S;
given λk, µ
−
k , µ
+
k , k ∈ K \ S.
Clearly, if qbk = 0 for all k ∈ S , then E¯D is equivalent
to ED and hence the solution to ED are the optimal
quantities (qb∗k , q
p∗
k )k∈S . Substitute these optimal quantities
into SY STEM . Note that the remaining optimization over
(qp∗k )k∈K\S can be separated into independent problems
(FRk)k∈K\S where the solution to FRk is the optimal
quantity qp∗k . This proves the sufficiency of condition (a).
Next, we prove the sufficiency of conditions (b) and (c).
The constraint (12a) implies that g¯ can be rewritten as:
g¯((qbk, q
p
k), (λk′ , µ
−
k′ , µ
+
k′)k′∈Kk\{k})
:=
∑
n
(
Scbn(q
b
n,k) + c
p
n(q
p
n,k)
)
−
∑
k′∈Kk\{k}
λk′1
>(dk − qpk)
−
∑
k′∈Kk\{k}
(
µ−k′ − µ+k′
)>
Hqbk.
It is easy to see that E¯D is equivalent to ED under
conditions (b) and (c). The separation of the remaining op-
timization into independent problems (FRk)k∈K\S follows
from the same arguments as before.
